The Value of Public Goods Generated by a Major League Sports Team: The CVM Approach by Groothuis, Peter & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Johnson, B.K., Groothuis, P.A., and Whitehead, J.C. (2001), The Value of Public Goods Generated by a Major 
League Sports Team: The CVM Approach. Journal of Sports Economics, 2(1): 6-21 (Feb 2001). Published by 
SAGE. doi:10.1177/152700250100200102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Value of Public Goods Generated by a Major 
League Sports Team: The CVM Approach 
Bruce K. Johnson, Peter A. Groothuis, and John C. Whitehead 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article reports an application of the contingent valuation method to measure the value 
of public goods generated by a professional sports team, the Pittsburgh Penguins of the 
National Hockey League. The data and analysis indicate that a major league sports team 
can produce widely consumed public goods such as civic pride and community spirit and 
that the value of those public goods may be substantial. However, in the case of the Penguins, 
the value of the public goods is far less than the cost of building a new arena. 
Although the analysis of public goods generated by other teams in other cities might lead 
to different results, the results of this article call into question the widespread practice of 
government funding of sports stadiums and arenas because it appears that the costs 
borne by taxpayers exceed the benefits received. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Most arenas and stadiums built for American major league sports teams in 
recent decades have received large government subsidies. Between 1990 and 1998, 
46 stadiums and arenas were built or substantially renovated for teams in the four 
major league sports. At the end of 1999, an additional 49 sports buildings were 
under construction or in the planning stages. About two thirds of the $21.7 billion 
spent on these 95 buildings will have come from government sources by the time 
construction is complete (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000, p. 95). 
 
Governments justify their subsidies of buildings for sports teams because, they 
claim, teams generate large positive externalities. Because teams cannot capture the 
benefits of those externalities through the market, the only way many cities can attract 
or keep a team is to subsidize construction of buildings for the teams to play in. 
Sports teams allegedly generate two types of external benefits. First, they allegedly 
increase an area’s aggregate income through additional tourism. Much of the 
increased spending on lodging, meals, and other travel and entertainment, if it 
occurs, will take place outside the stadium or arena and will not accrue to the team 
or building owners. 
 
But the research is clear. Stadiums and professional sports do not generate significant 
increases in income (Baade & Dye, 1990; Baade & Sanderson, 1997; Noll 
&Zimbalist, 1997; Rosentraub, 1996). Because the spending multipliers of professional 
sports teams may be lower than those for most other industries (Noll & 
Zimbalist, 1997, pp. 74-75) and because teams may divert significant spending 
from other activities, sports teams may even reduce area income. Some weak evidence 
is consistent with this. In particular, Baade and Sanderson (1997, p. 105) find 
that in some cities, a city’s share of its state’s employment in leisure and recreation 
tended to fall with the addition of a team or new stadium. 
 
The second type of positive externality generated by sports teams occurs if a 
team produces public goods. Local unity, fan loyalty, and civic pride are nonrivalrous 
and nonexcludable. People talk about their team, cheer for its success, and celebrate 
its victories and may do so without buying tickets or making any payment to the 
team. Perhaps the most spectacular manifestations of such public goods are the raucous 
street parties and demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of fans in cities 
whose teams win league championships. Economists acknowledge that the cultural 
significance of sports probably exceeds its business significance (Noll & Zimbalist, 
1997, p. 56; Quirk & Fort, 1992, p. 58). 
 
Even though the value of sports public goods may be large, economists have 
rarely attempted to measure them. This article applies the contingent valuation 
method (CVM) to measure the value of public goods generated by a major league 
sports team. The CVM has been designed to measure the value of goods not traded 
in markets and has been widely used in the environmental economic literature to 
measure the value of environmental public goods. Recent applications of CVM to 
policy analysis include siting of a hazardous waste disposal facility (Groothuis,Van 
Houtven, & Whitehead, 1998) and historical site preservation (Chambers, Chambers,& 
Whitehead, 1998). Johnson and Whitehead (2000) first applied it to sports. 
They determined the value of public goods generated by two proposed projects in 
Lexington, Kentucky: a new arena for the University of Kentucky basketball team 
and a stadium to attract a minor league baseball team. They found that neither pro- 
ject generated sufficiently large positive externalities to justify substantial public 
financing of the projects. 
 
Neither project studied by Johnson and Whitehead (2000) involved an established 
major league team that presented a credible threat to move to another city. 
Although Johnson and Whitehead showed the feasibility of using CVM for sports, 
they did not answer the questions most relevant to the stadium subsidy issue: How 
valuable are the public goods generated by major league sports teams, and how 
widely are these public goods consumed by a city’s population? This article 
attempts to answer those questions. 
 
 
2. PITTSBURGH PENGUINS 
 
This article applies CVM to measure the value of public goods generated by the 
Pittsburgh Penguins of the National Hockey League (NHL) for residents of the 
Pittsburgh Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The Penguins declared Chapter 11 
bankruptcy in October 1998 and were at risk of moving to another city or being disbanded 
by the NHL. 
 
In March 1999, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Bernard Markovitz issued a permanent 
injunction against any owners, present or future, from discussing a possible sale to 
owners who would move the Penguins to another city. Markovitz wrote, 
 
The Penguins are as much a part of the warp and woof (sic) of this community as are 
its other professional sports teams, museums, parks, theaters and ethnic 
neighborhoods. 
As important as [the creditors’] interests are, they may have to give way when 
the interest of the community at large so dictates. In this case, it so dictates. (“Penguins 
Must Stay in Pittsburgh,” 1999, p. G2) 
 
At a hearing on May 28, 1999, Judge Markovitz said the Penguins “are woven into 
the fabric of the city and county and surrounding counties” (“Power Play,” 1999, 
p. A14). 
 
Markovitz’s contention that the Penguins are part of the fabric of metropolitan 
Pittsburgh is consistent with the claim that the Penguins generate valuable and 
widely consumed public goods. Markovitz believes the public goods are so valuable 
that he enjoined the team from leaving Pittsburgh, even though potential buyers 
who wanted to move the team to another city had reportedly offered $85 million 
for the team (Barnes, 1999, p. B1). 
 
Why might Markovitz believe the Penguins generate valuable public goods? 
The Penguins flourished on the ice in the 1990s. They won the Stanley Cup in 1991 
and 1992 and contended in other years. Without an NBA team to compete for fans, 
Pittsburgh hockey received an unusually high level of attention, and Pittsburgh was 
regarded as one of the most enthusiastic hockey towns in the NHL (Lapointe, 1998, 
p. D5). 
 
 
In June 1999, Markovitz accepted an offer from a consortium of local investors 
to buy the team for $65 million, plus the conversion of $20 million debt to Mario 
Lemieux into equity. The team owed the retired player more than $30 million in 
deferred salary. Lemieux agreed to convert $20 million of his deferred salary into an 
equity interest in the team (Sandomir, 1999, p. D3). 
 
The circumstances surrounding the Penguins in 1998-1999 provided an ideal 
background in which to conduct a CVM analysis of the value of public goods generated 
by a sports team. At no time during the bankruptcy proceedings did the Penguins 
or the NHL demand or request that Pittsburgh build a new arena for the Penguins. 
Thus, a hypothetical scenario for the CVM survey could concentrate on one 
question—what are the Penguins worth to Pittsburgh, instead of what are the Penguins 
and a new arena worth? 
 
 
3. THEORY 
 
Suppose survey respondents possess the utility function u = u(x, h, z), where u is 
increasing in x, h, and z; x measures consumption of Penguins hockey games, h is 
the existence of hockey in Pittsburgh, and z is a composite commodity of market 
goods. The existence of hockey results in both public and private goods being produced. 
The budget constraint is y = z + px, where y is income and p is the money cost 
of hockey game consumption, including ticket prices and travel costs. The price of 
the composite commodity is normalized at 1, and the existence of hockey public 
goods is an unpriced nonmarket good. 
 
Solving the utility maximization problem yields the indirect utility function, u = 
v(p, h, y), which is decreasing in p and increasing in h and y. If respondents minimize 
expenditures, z + px, subject to the utility constraint, the expenditure function 
results, e = e(p, h, u). The expenditure function is increasing in p and u and decreasing 
in h. 
 
With the loss of hockey in Pittsburgh (h = 0), the expenditures necessary to reach 
the reference utility level increase. The difference between expenditure functions is 
the willingness to pay for Penguins hockey, 
 
WTP = e(p′, 0, u) – e(p, h, u),    (1) 
 
where WTP is willingness to pay and p′ is the price at which no hockey games are 
consumed. Substitution of v(p, h, y) into (1) for u yields the following compensating 
variation (CV) function: 
 
CV = e(p′, 0, v(p, h, y)) – y,    (2) 
 
where CV(p, h, y) is the variation function and y = e(p, h, v(p, h, y)). The effect of 
income on the compensating variation is 
 
∂CV/∂y = (∂e′/∂v)(∂v/∂y) – 1 = (∂e′/∂v)/(∂e/∂v) – 1,  (3) 
 
where e’ = e(p’, 0, v(p, h, y)). If h is a normal good, the marginal cost of utility is 
lower with the existence and availability of hockey, (∂e′/∂v)/(∂e/∂v) > 1, and the 
income effect is positive, ∂CV/∂y > 0. If h is an inferior good, the income effect is 
negative. 
 
The variation function can be decomposed into use and nonuse values. Nonuse 
value (NUV) is the amount of money people are willing to pay when they attend 
zero games, 
 
NUV = e(p′, 0, v(p, h, y)) – e(p′, h, v(p, h, y)).  (4) 
 
Note that the choke price is invoked in each expenditure function. Use value is the 
willingness to pay for the game attendance. Use value (UV) is the difference 
between equations (2) and (4), 
 
UV = e(p′, h, v(p, h, y)) – y.    (5) 
 
Use value is the willingness to pay to avoid the choke price with hockey remaining 
in Pittsburgh. 
 
 
4. SURVEY 
 
To obtain information on the value that citizens place on professional sports 
teams, we developed a CVM survey questionnaire. The definitions and descriptive 
statistics of the variables taken from the survey and used throughout this article 
appear in Table 1. This section describes additional details about the survey. 
 
The CVM captures both use and nonuse values (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). Use 
value is the portion of willingness to pay generated by the revealed behavior of 
attending games (i.e., consuming private goods). Nonuse value is the portion of 
willingness to pay coming from consumption of public goods, such as talking about 
the team with friends and family. Our CVM survey presented a contingent valuation 
scenario designed to elicit WTP for Penguins hockey, as defined in equation 
(5). Empirical procedures are used to determine what portion of WTP is for public 
goods (equation (4)) and what portion is for private goods (equation (5)). 
 
The survey was organized into five sections, three of which provide the data for 
this article. After a brief section about professional football and baseball in Pittsburgh, 
the survey asked respondents about their consumption of Penguins hockey. 
Questions asked how many games they attend each season at Civic Arena and how 
many theywatch onTV. The survey asked howoften they read about and discuss the 
Penguins during the hockey season. Questions asked respondents to describe their 
level of interest in the Penguins and to indicate how the quality of life in western 
Pennsylvania would change if the Penguins left. 
 
The third section of the survey covered the valuation of Pittsburgh Penguins 
hockey. The valuation section began with some background information: 
 
The Pittsburgh Penguins declared bankruptcy last year in federal court and almost left 
Pittsburgh. The federal judge handling the case declared that the Penguins are too 
important to Pittsburgh to allow them to leave. After several months, a local group 
headed by former Penguin star Mario Lemieux took over the team and promised to 
keep the Penguins in Pittsburgh. 
 
Respondents were then asked whether keeping the Penguins in Pittsburgh is important 
and whether they thought losing the Penguins would hurt Pittsburgh’s image as 
a major city. 
 
The survey then presented respondents with a scenario in which the Penguins 
might leave Pittsburgh: 
 
The Penguins continue to play in one of the worst arenas in the NHL and Pittsburgh is 
a fairly small market. The new owners might not have enough money to support a 
payroll 
for a team that could challenge for the Stanley Cup. If more local investors are not 
found, the team may leave Pittsburgh. Some say this would damage Pittsburgh’s 
national image and it would mean the city would never have the excitement of a Stanley 
Cup championship again. 
 
The survey offered an alternative scenario in which the Penguins would become 
publicly owned at a cost to taxpayers: 
 
If the city of Pittsburgh were to buy the team, it would never leave Pittsburgh. But in 
order for the city to buy the team, pay off its debts, and challenge for the Stanley Cup, 
taxpayer money will be needed. One estimate is that each Pittsburgh household would 
have to pay $TAX each year in higher city taxes. 
 
The four $TAX amounts ($1, $5, $10, and $25) were randomly assigned. 
Then respondents were asked the discrete-choice willingness-to-pay question—“ 
Would you be willing to pay $TAX each year out of your own household 
budget in higher city taxes to help keep the Penguins in Pittsburgh?”—and were 
given three response categories: “Yes,” “No,” and “I don’t know.” All respondents 
were then asked the open-ended willingness-to-pay question: “What is the most 
you would be willing to pay out of your own household budget each year in higher 
city taxes to keep the Penguins in Pittsburgh?” They were presented with the following 
“payment card” categories to choose in response to the question: “Zero,” 
“Between $0.01 and $4.99,” “Between $5 and $14.99,” “Between $15 and $29.99,” 
“Between $30 and $49.99,” “Between $50 and $75,” and “More than $75.” 
Debriefing questions followed, asking why they were willing or not to pay taxes to 
keep the Penguins from leaving. 
 
The third section of the survey concluded with two questions asking whether 
respondents had lived in Pittsburgh when the Penguins won the Stanley Cup in 1991 
and 1992 and how they had celebrated the Cup victories. Respondents could answer 
that they did not watch or celebrate, that they celebrated by consuming public goods 
(e.g., watched games at a sports bar, celebrated with friends, partied in the streets, 
etc.), or that they celebrated by consuming private goods, namely, attended Stanley 
Cup games in person. 
 
 
 
 
 
The fourth section of the survey asked respondents several questions about the 
impact of various Pittsburgh-area institutions on civic pride. The fifth and concluding 
section of the survey asked about household size, gender, race, age, tenure in 
western Pennsylvania, education, and income. 
 
 
5. DATA 
 
In February 2000, we sent a CVM survey to a sample, purchased from a professional 
sampling firm, of 900 randomly selected households in the Pittsburgh MSA. 
Seventy-eight surveys of the 900 mailed out proved undeliverable. Of the 822 delivered, 
respondents returned 293, a response rate of 35.6%.We also placed 200 sur- 
veys on windshields of cars parked at Civic Arena during the Penguins’ game on 
April 1. Sixteen cases are included from this survey. The empirical analysis uses all 
226 surveys in which respondents answered every question but income. As is typical 
with CVM surveys, the valuation and income questions create the greatest 
nonresponse problems. In this survey, 5.4% (n = 16) and 11.9% (n = 35) of the sample 
did not answer the open-ended valuation and income questions. These two 
questions account for most of the item nonresponse. 
 
In cases where all but the income questions were answered, income was estimated 
as a function of the demographic characteristics reported in the sample. 
Using estimated income, the number of usable responses increases by 24 to 226. A 
summary of the variables, their description, and summary statistics is presented in 
Table 1. 
 
In this sample, respondents attend an average of 1.75 Penguins games per year, 
with a range of 0 to 42. Most respondents (61%) attend zero games. About 31% 
attend fewer than 5 games. They watch an average of just under 11 games, with a 
range from 0 to 95, on television. More than 36%watch zero games, and the median 
number of games watched is about 4. The correlation between games watched and 
attended is 0.427. 
 
Forty-four percent of respondents said they read about the Penguins at least a 
few days per week, whereas 33% said they talk with friends about the Penguins. 
Seventy-two percent identified themselves as Penguins fans, and 42% said the 
quality of life in Pittsburgh would fall if the Penguins left. 
 
The average tax amount presented to respondents is $10.82, with between 21% 
and 29% of respondents receiving each of the four tax amounts. Thirty-eight percent 
of the sample said that they would pay the tax amount, but 49% said they would 
not pay and 13% said they did not know. On the payment card question immediately 
following, 48.5% said they would not be willing to pay anything. After coding the 
maximum willingness-to-pay values at the midpoint of the offered intervals and 
conservatively coding the highest amount at $75, the average maximum willingness 
to pay is $7.11. 
 
As in many CVM surveys, the average respondent is somewhat older than is the 
average resident. The average respondent in this sample is 52.4 years old, whereas 
59.7% of the MSA population in 1997was younger than age 45. Seventy-three percent 
of the respondents were male, compared to 48.1% of the Pennsylvania population. 
The empirical model is weighted to account for the overrepresentation of 
males in the sample. But in other respects, the sample appears typical of the Pittsburgh 
MSA. The average household size in the sample was 2.68 compared to 2.25 
in the MSA. Ninety-four percent of the sample identified themselves as White, 
compared to 90.5% in the MSA. The sample’s average income was $49,700, compared 
to the MSA average of $55,779. 
 
6. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
Using standard CVM methodology, the survey results can reveal whether people 
are willing to pay to keep a team in town. Furthermore, WTP can be decomposed 
into use value and nonuse value components. In the present case, the use value represents 
WTP for attendance at Penguins games. The nonuse value measures the 
 
WTP for the consumption of public goods resulting from having the Penguins in 
Pittsburgh. 
 
To derive such results, a WTP model for the Penguins was specified as 
 
WTP = f($TAX, INCOME, USE, GAMES, WATCH, 
PUBGOOD, STANCUP, CELEBRATE, WINDSHIELD, D), (6) 
 
where $TAX is the amount of yearly tax the respondent was asked to pay for the 
Penguins, and INCOME measures ability to pay the increased taxes. Theory suggests 
that the exogenous access price should be included as an independent variable. 
However, in our sample, there is little variation in the ticket price and travel 
costs of game attendance. Therefore, we include two variables to account for choke 
and access prices. The dummy variable USE takes a value of 1 if the respondent 
attends one or more hockey games per year. The number of Penguins games 
attended during the past year is GAMES and allows a distinction between those 
who are frequent attenders and those who are not. This specification follows Johnson 
and Whitehead (2000). The number of games watched on TV is measured by 
WATCH, and PUBGOOD is a variable that represents the public good aspects of 
the Penguins. 
 
The variable STANCUP takes a value of 1 if the respondent said he or she 
attended or watched on TV the Penguins’ Stanley Cup championships in 1991 and 
1992. The variable CELEBRATE takes a value of 1 if the respondent said he or she 
celebrated the championships by consuming public goods such as attending a victory 
parade or celebrating in the streets. The vector D contains standard demographic 
variables concerning age, sex, race, and the like. Complete definitions and 
summary statistics of all variables used are given in Table 1. 
 
If hockey is a normal good, WTP should increase with income. The expected 
effects of other demographic variables, with the possible exception of sex, are 
ambiguous. WTP should be higher for those who attend games than for those who 
do not, and more frequent attenders should be willing to pay more than less frequent 
attenders. The more games a person watches onTV, the higher the WTP should be. 
Each of these variables allows measurement of the use value of Penguins 
hockey. The nonuse value can be calculated as the residual difference between 
WTP and use value and is measured by setting USE and GAMES equal to zero. 
The public good characteristics of the Penguins were measured with a series of 
behavioral and attitudinal questions. Dummy variables measuring the importance 
of activities related to the Penguins were summed to form a scale variable, 
PUBGOOD. The first component of PUBGOOD measured the amount of reading 
done about the Penguins: “During the season, how often do you read about the Penguins 
in newspapers or in magazines?” The choices were “never,” “rarely,” “a few 
days per week,” and “daily.” The variable READ is equal to zero if the respondent 
answered “never” or “rarely” and is equal to 1 otherwise. Forty-four percent of the 
sample reads about the Penguins at least a few days per week. 
 
The second variable measures the amount of conversation about the Penguins. 
Respondents were asked how often they discuss the Penguins with others and were 
given the same choices they had in the READ question. TALK is defined parallel to 
 
READ. Thirty-four percent of the sample talks about the Penguins at least a few 
days per week. 
 
The third component of the PUBGOOD variable measures the respondents’ 
overall level of interest in the Penguins. For those who identified themselves as 
“diehard fans” or “casual fans,” INTEREST equals 1, whereas for those who “don’t 
pay any attention” or are “tired of hearing about the Penguins,” INTEREST equals 
zero. Seventy-two percent identified themselves as Penguins fans. 
 
The fourth variable making up PUBGOOD measures attitudes about the Penguins’ 
contribution to overall quality of life in western Pennsylvania. If respondents 
said they believe the quality of life would fall “slightly” or “a great deal” if the Penguins 
left, then QUAL takes a value of 1. If they answered that the quality of life 
would “remain unchanged,” “improve slightly,” or “improve a great deal” without 
the Penguins, QUAL takes a value of zero. Forty-two percent of respondents 
thought losing the Penguins would harm the quality of life in Pittsburgh. 
 
The variable PUBGOOD equals the sum of READ, TALK, INTEREST, and 
QUAL and is increasing in the consumption of public goods produced by the Penguins. 
Considering the small sample size, the scale is reliable according to 
Cronbach’s alpha (α = 0.74). 
 
In addition to PUBGOOD, another variable is used to measure public good consumption. 
In championship seasons, the excitement surrounding teams increases, 
and many people may become fans who otherwise would pay little attention to the 
team. Longtime fans of the team may become even more enthusiastic supporters. 
Spontaneous street celebrations often break out when the home team clinches a 
championship, and cities routinely stage parades in honor of the championship 
teams. Both the quantity and quality of public goods generated by a champion may 
differ from those generated by an also-ran. 
 
The survey asked respondents whether and how they celebrated the Penguins’ 
Stanley Cup titles in 1991 and 1992. They could answer that they did not celebrate, 
that they attended the title games in person, or that they watched the games on TV in 
bars, partied in the streets, celebrated with friends, or attended a city parade in 
honor of the team. CELEBRATE equals 1 if they reported celebrating in the streets, 
celebrating with friends, or attending a city parade and zero otherwise. 
 
7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The initial test of the willingness-to-pay data is whether the discrete-choice 
responses conform to economic theory, with the percentage yes responses falling as 
the tax amount increases. This is tested with the multinomial logit model with YES 
as the dependent variable, allowing the coefficient vectors of the “no” and “don’t 
know” responses to be different. The percentage of “no” and “don’t know” 
responses both increase as the tax amount increases. The results are significant at 
the 1% level. This result indicates that respondents are rationally responsive to 
price. 
 
Due to the prevalence of zero willingness-to-pay values, the willingness-to-pay 
data are analyzed with the Tobit model. Because WTP and GAMES are potentially 
determined jointly, the simultaneous-equations version of Tobit was used first to 
test for exogeneity. The exogeneity of GAMES could not be rejected, so the results 
appearing in Table 2 are based on GAMES being exogenous. Willingness to pay is 
specified to depend on hockey consumption and socioeconomic variables. Because 
the coefficient on the tax amount variable is not statistically significant, we conclude 
that the tax amount proposed in the survey does not influence the amount of 
the final willingness to pay. 
 
The positive income coefficient is statistically insignificant. The joint hypotheses 
that all of the other demographic coefficients equal zero could not be rejected, 
and those variables were dropped from the model. Also, the coefficient on the 
WINDSHIELD variable is not statistically significant, indicating that the willingness- 
to-pay values from the mail and windshield survey respondents are similar. 
 
The coefficient on USE is positive and significant, with a one-tail probability 
value of 0.027. The marginal effect of USE indicates that a person who attends at 
least one game per year is willing to pay $2.88 per year in higher taxes to keep the 
Penguins from moving. The coefficient on GAMES is positive and significant, with 
a marginal effect of 0.32. Assuming that the marginal effect is equal to the average, 
a person attending 10 games per year would thus be willing to pay, ceteris paribus, 
$3.20 per year in higher taxes in addition to the $2.88 from participation (USE). 
The coefficient on WATCH is zero and insignificant, indicating that TV viewership 
has no effect on WTP. The coefficient on PUBGOOD is positive and significant. 
Its marginal effect indicates that WTP increases by $2.31 for each of the four 
types of public goods included in PUBGOOD. 
 
The coefficient on STANCUP is positive and highly significant, with a marginal 
effect of $4.47. Coupled with the results on CELEBRATE, which is insignificant, 
this suggests that experiencing a championship significantly increases the WTP for 
a sports team but only if a person views the games. The celebration afterward seems 
to have no impact on WTP. 
 
 
 
 
Mean WTP, use and nonuse value, and 95% confidence intervals are estimated 
by evaluating the coefficients from the Tobit model at the mean of the independent 
variables. Table 3 presents the results. Nonuse value estimates were found by set- 
ting the user status and the number of games attended equal to zero. Use value is 
then estimated as the difference between the mean WTP and the estimated nonuse 
value. WTP for the Penguins is $5.57, which decomposes into a nonuse value of 
$4.08 and a use value of $1.49. Both the use and nonuse values are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Nonuse value placed on the Penguins is about 2.7 times the 
use value. The difference in use value and nonuse value is significant at the 95% 
confidence level. 
 
 
8. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Do the WTP estimates derived here help explain the widespread support for the 
public subsidy of sports facilities? Was Judge Markovitz on firm footing when he 
asserted the Penguins’ importance to the civic fabric of Pittsburgh? 
 
To answer these questions, the annual WTP must be aggregated for the 
entirehttp://www.tribuy.com/items/3038.jpg population. If aggregate WTP is 
interpreted as the annual flow of benefits generated by the team, the present discounted 
value of the stream of future benefits can be interpreted as the capital value 
of the benefits generated by the team. If the capital value of the nonuse, or public 
good, benefits generated by a team exceeds the subsidies paid to the team, and if the 
team would otherwise not locate in the city, then the subsidy may appear desirable 
to local politicians and their constituents. The subsidy may or may not be economically 
efficient, depending on whether the benefits are greater than the costs. Also, 
the subsidy may or may not be equitable, depending on whether those who bear the 
cost of the subsidy are those who receive the benefits from the team. 
 
The aggregate annual WTP, as well as its use value and nonuse value components, 
is shown in Table 4.We employ two conservative aggregation rules in order 
to not overstate the value of the Penguins. Typically, a menu of public projects will 
pass the benefit-cost test. However, the menu of projects is not affordable with public 
funds.With conservative aggregation rules, we avoid potentially recommending 
the expenditure of public funds for a project (at the expense of other worthy projects) 
that does not pass the benefit-cost test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To estimate the net present value of the benefits generated by the Penguins in 
Pittsburgh, we multiplied the mean WTP estimates by the number of households in 
the MSA in 1997. This aggregation rule downwardly biases the aggregate benefits 
if households outside the Pittsburgh MSA value the Penguins. However, further 
extrapolating the WTP values outside the Pittsburgh MSA will lead to 
upward-biased aggregate WTP estimates if those outside the Pittsburgh MSA place 
a lower value on the Penguins. Also, without information on the relationship 
between distance and WTP, the geographic extent of the Penguins market is 
uncertain. 
 
Following standard survey research results, we expect nonrespondents to have 
WTP values less than or equal to the WTP values of the respondents. The 
upper-bound WTP estimates were calculated by multiplying the number of households 
by the estimated WTP, assuming that nonrespondent WTP is equal to respondent WTP. 
Because only 35.6% of the mail surveys were returned, the lower-bound 
figures are 35.6% of the upper-bound figures. The 64.4% of the sample who failed 
to return the surveys are assumed to have no interest in the Penguins and, following 
the practice recommended by Mitchell and Carson (1989, p. 282), are assumed to 
have zero WTP. The true value of aggregate WTP lies between the upper and lower 
bounds. 
 
The upper-bound aggregate WTP is about $5.3 million. The lower-bound aggregate 
WTP is about $1.9 million. These figures can be regarded as annual benefit 
streams to be received in perpetuity because the hypothetical scenario presented in 
the survey said “the team would never leave Pittsburgh,” and the present discounted 
values can be easily calculated. Table 4 presents upper- and lower-bound values 
discounted at 8%. Under these assumptions, present discounted value of aggregate 
benefits could range from about $23.5 million to $66 million. 
 
Table 4 also shows the capitalized use and nonuse value components of WTP. 
The upper-bound present value of nonuse value, discounted at 8%, is about $48.3 
million. The lower bound is about $17.2 million. Clearly, even the most conservative 
estimate of nonuse value indicates that the Penguins generate substantial benefits 
from public goods. A lower bound of $17.2 million is about 20% of the market 
value of the team, whereas the upper bound of $48.3 million is about 57% of the 
market value. These lower and upper bounds are based entirely on the value of the 
public goods associated with the team. 
 
Of course, Judge Markovitz ignored potential nonuse benefits that would have 
accrued to another city, such as Portland, Oregon, had the Penguins relocated. It is 
possible that the nonuse benefits would be larger elsewhere than in Pittsburgh. But 
Markovitz was correct in asserting that the total value of the Penguins significantly 
exceeded their market value. 
 
The nonuse values also shed light on the question of whether subsidized arenas 
and stadiums to attract or keep teams are justified. The Penguins do not generate 
enough public goods to justify complete public financing of a new arena, typically 
costing $180 million to $220 million. 
 
If per capita WTP in Pittsburgh is typical of WTP in other metropolitan areas, it 
is possible that in a few large cities, WTP is sufficiently large to justify full subsidy 
of an arena. If the upper-bound NUV reported in Table 4 accurately measures 
nonuse values, then a city with a population four times as great as Pittsburgh’s could 
justify a properly designed subsidy equal to the cost of a new arena. But there are 
only two metropolitan areas with as much as four times Pittsburgh’s population— 
Los Angeles and New York. 
 
It is likely that the true nonuse value WTP is somewhere between the upper and 
lower bounds reported in Table 4. If the lower-bound estimate, which avoids potential 
sample selection bias, is a more accurate measure, then the value of public 
goods generated by a sports team would not be large enough even in New York to 
justify a subsidy as large as $200 million. 
 
If the upper-bound estimate is accurate, the value of public goods generated in 
Los Angeles or New York, though larger than the cost of most new arenas, could 
justify such a large subsidy only if it were critical to attracting or keeping a team. 
Given the large market sizes of Los Angeles and New York, they are the least likely 
cities to require a subsidy to attract or keep a team. 
Even if the WTP nonuse values equaled or exceeded the cost of building an 
arena, the decision to subsidize the arena would reduce the welfare of some if those 
willing to pay zero were taxed, a likely event because about half the respondents 
indicated their maximum WTP was zero. Unless some mechanism for identifying 
and taxing only those with positive WTP could be found, it is unlikely that any partial 
or total subsidy of an arena would be a Pareto improvement. 
Yet most arenas and stadiums are heavily subsidized. Local and state elected 
officials all across the country have enthusiastically courted teams with new buildings 
and generous leases. They must believe that the political benefits exceed the 
political costs. The most likely explanation, if the WTP figures for the Penguins are 
typical for other teams in other cities, is a simple public choice story. Fans of pro 
sports are easier to identify and organize than are nonfans. They are well aware of 
the benefits they receive from their teams. They see a subsidy paid for by general tax 
revenues as an opportunity to shift some of the costs of sports to other groups, and 
politicians recognize that they will be rewarded at the ballot box if they subsidize an 
arena. 
 
 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The data and analysis in this article indicate that major league sports teams generate 
widely consumed public goods for the residents of their cities. With 72% of 
the respondents identifying themselves as Penguins fans, even though less than 
40% attend games, the claim that sports provide a unifying element to civic life is 
certainly plausible. Furthermore, a little more than half the respondents indicated 
they would be willing to pay for hockey-related public goods rather than lose them. 
However, the analysis suggests that the value of public goods generated by 
major league sports teams may not be large enough to justify the large public subsidies 
typically offered to most stadiums and arenas built today. Coupled with the 
overwhelming evidence of previous research that major league sports teams and 
their stadiums do not generate increased income for their cities, it would seem that 
publicly financed sport buildings represent a misallocation of resources. 
 
Several caveats are in order. First, although Pittsburgh enjoys a reputation as a 
good hockey city (Lapointe, 1998, p. D5), hockey remains the least popular of the 
four major league team sports in the United States. It is possible that the value of the 
public goods generated by hockey teams falls short of the values generated by other 
sports teams. 
 
Second, the analysis is based entirely on data from Pittsburgh, and although 
there is no particular reason to regard Pittsburgh as unusual or atypical in its attitudes 
toward professional sports, there is no particular reason to regard it as typical 
either. These results may not be representative of other cities. 
Combined with the results of Johnson and Whitehead (2000), the results of this 
analysis call into question claims that the public goods created by sports teams generally 
justify large public subsidies. But it is possible that teams in different sports 
and cities may sometimes produce more valuable public goods. Only further 
research can answer the question. 
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